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  This paper reviews the literature on the economics of invasive species management as it ap-
plies to invasive species in general and terrestrial invasive species in particular. The paper 
summarizes a number of recent studies that assign values to the economic impact of terrestrial 
invasive species on a national scale. This is followed by a review of the economic literature on 
control and prevention of a biological invasion and the literature on international trade and 
trade policy with invasive species. The paper then reviews selected studies on terrestrial inva-
sive plants, animals, and microbes, respectively. 
 




Throughout history the spread of plants, animals, 
and other organisms has been governed by natural 
ecological processes and has accompanied trade 
in goods and services and the movement of hu-
mans. As a consequence, species are continually 
introduced to areas outside their native geo-
graphic location and some of these species estab-
lish themselves as harmful invaders. Invasive 
species are one of the leading causes of global 
ecological change. Of 256 vertebrate extinctions 
with an identifiable cause, 109 are known to be 
due to biological invaders, while 70 are known to 
be caused by human exploitation (Cox 1993). In 
the United States, it is estimated that 40 percent 
of the threatened or endangered species are at risk 
due to pressures from invasive species (Nature 
Conservancy 1996, Wilcove et al. 1998). Invasive 
species also impose significant economic losses 
to consumer and producer welfare. 
  The problems associated with invasive species 
are not new and have long been recognized. U.S. 
invasive species policy dates to the Lacey Act of 
1900. In recent years, however, increased global-
ization has led scientists and policymakers to fo-
cus more attention on the potential costs associ-
ated with invasive species introductions. Of the 
nearly 30 federal U.S. acts pertaining to invasive 
species, approximately half have been adopted 
since 1990 (National Agricultural Library 2006).
1 
  As recognition of invasive species problems 
has grown, so has the economics literature. The 
purpose of this paper is to review the methodo-
logical literature on the economics of invasive 
species management as it applies to invasive spe-
cies in general and terrestrial invasive species in 
particular. The paper is organized as follows. It 
begins with a summary of a number of recent 
studies that assign values to the economic impact 
of terrestrial invasive species on a national scale. 
This is followed by a review of the economics 
literature on control and prevention of a biologi-
cal invasion. The section after that surveys the 
literature on international trade and trade policy 
with invasive species. The paper then reviews 
selected studies on terrestrial invasive plants, ani-
mals, and microbes, respectively. The final sec-
tion contains brief, concluding remarks. 
  There are important aspects of the literature 
that are not reviewed here. The focus of this sur-
vey is only on terrestrial invasive species. Aquatic 
invasive species are examined in the companion 
                                                                                    
1 The fact that policy measures have increased contemporaneously 
with trade volumes has helped mitigate potential introductions. A 1993 
report by the Office of Technology Assessment found no clear evi-
dence that the rate of observed invasive species imports increased over 
the previous 50 years (Office of Technology Assessment 1993). 
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paper by Lovell, Stone, and Fernandez (2006). In 
addition, this paper does not attempt an exhaus-
tive survey of the numerous case studies of indi-
vidual species in specific locations that assign 
values for control costs or damages or both. Many 
of these are referenced in the recent studies that 
value the economic impact of invasive species on 
a regional or national scale. These studies com-
bine estimates of invasive species impacts from a 
large number of different sources whose reliabil-
ity varies tremendously. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to evaluate the assumptions that under-
lie each disaggregate estimate. Instead, it is left to 
the interested reader to consult the sources cited 
in the next section.
2 
  A number of issues are closely related to the 
economics of invasive species. Among them are 
the economics of intraseasonal pest management 
(Carlson and Wetzstein 1993), the economics of 
resistance (Laxminarayan 2002), and the eco-
nomics of infectious disease control in humans 
(Philipson 2000). While the literature on these 
topics is relevant for the management of invasive 
species, it is not the focus of this survey. 
  Invasive species are biological resources. As 
such, the economic modeling of invasive species 
problems has its roots in the literature on the bio-
economics of renewable resources (e.g., Clark 
1990). At the same time, there exist important 
differences in the characteristics of the two prob-
lems and the policy questions of concern. While 
renewable resources are typically viewed as valu-
able, invasive species are pests that cause damage 
and are sometimes referred to as biological pollu-
tion. For example, the value of annual crop losses 
to weeds in the United States has been estimated 
at $20 billion in 1991 dollars (USDA 2000), with 
roughly 50–75 percent of the costs attributed to 
nonindigenous weed species (Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment 1993). In economic models of 
renewable resources, a primary concern is to 
characterize the harvest policy that maximizes 
economic welfare over time, including consump-
tive benefits from harvest, the cost of harvest, and 
non-consumptive benefits associated with the 
resource stock. For invasive species, the primary 
                                                                                    
2 Born, Rauschmayer, and Bräuer (2005) provide a non-exhaustive 
review of 23 papers and classify them as decision aids or impact as-
sessments. They examine 10 papers in detail that focus primarily on 
agricultural pests in only a few countries, and on an ex post evaluation 
of control that typically does not account for uncertainty. 
concern of management is to reduce damages 
through prevention or control, or both, in order to 
minimize the discounted sum of damages and 
prevention and control costs over time. A signifi-
cant amount of resources is spent on these activi-
ties. In 2000 and 2001, global pesticide expendi-
tures were over $30 billion (Keily, Donaldson, 
and Grube 2004). This includes expenditures on 
both indigenous and non-indigenous pests. Pre-
vention activities account for approximately half 
of U.S. federal expenditures for invasive species 
(National Invasive Species Council 2001). 
  Both control and prevention can involve a vari-
ety of inputs or policy instruments. Harvesting, 
chemical or biological controls, and mechanical 
or manual removal may be used to reduce the size 
of an invasion. In many cases, cooperation be-
tween public agencies and private stakeholders is 
important if effective control is to be achieved. 
Monitoring can improve control efforts by al-
lowing rapid, targeted responses to pest out-
breaks. Preventive mechanisms include trade bans, 
inspection and quarantine, treatment, and export 
pre-clearance programs. Each of these inputs and 
policy instruments has its own characteristics. 
The diverse set of ecological, economic, and pol-
icy issues that distinguish invasive species prob-
lems has led to many interesting research ideas. 
The Economic Impacts of Terrestrial Invasive 
Species 
A number of recent studies attempt to value the 
economic impact of invasive species on a national 
scale. Table 1 summarizes the findings of these 
studies for terrestrial invasive species. Not all 
invasive species are included, nor are all invasive 
species impacts. Individual estimates are calcu-
lated in a variety of different ways, including ex-
trapolation from small to large scales, and the 
estimates include measures of both damages and 
control costs. It is not uncommon for aggregate 
values to be obtained by multiplying a constant 
marginal damage per pest by an estimate of the 
total pest population (or pest units if population is 
not the measure). While this provides useful in-
formation about the potential magnitude of dam-
ages, it is not a reliable statistical estimate. If the 
pest population is very large, then a relatively 
small change in the damage assigned to one indi-
vidual can lead to differences in aggregate values  180   April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Annual Economic Impact of Terrestrial Invasive Species on a National Scale 
  Type of Invasive 
Country Plant  Animal  Microbial 
Australia (in $AU)  4 billion





(10 vertebrates, includes 
environmental costs) 
 
Canada (in $CAN)  38.21 million
d 







(emerald ash borer) 
1.5 million
d 
(Dutch elm disease) 
73.34 million
e 




Germany (in i) 103  million





(Dutch elm disease) 
New Zealand (in 
$NZ) 
100 million







United States (in 
$US) 
34.5 billion
j 59.4  billion
j 39.7  billion
j 
a Sinden et al. (2004). 
b Bomford and Hart (2002). 
c McLeod (2004). 
d Colautti et al. (2006). 
e One-time event, Colautti et al. (2006). 
f Reinhardt et al. (2003). 
g Williams and Timmins (2002) 
h Clout (2002). 
i Barlow and Goldson (2002). 
j Pimentel, Zuniga, and Morrison (2005). 
 
 
of large magnitude. Further, when pest damages 
affect the market for a good, as with many agri-
cultural products, the average price of the product 
lost to the pest is less than the observed market 
price. If market price of the product is used as a 
proxy for the value of each unit lost to pest dam-
age, then an upward bias in total damages is in-
troduced, although conservative assumptions about 
damages per pest may offset this to some extent. 
More generally, if damages are nonlinear, then 
policy evaluation can be improved by a more ac-
curate assessment of the damage function. In spite 
of these difficulties, the national values do pro-
vide some information about the economic im-
pacts of invasive species. The large magnitudes 
indicate that terrestrial invasive species impose 
significant social costs. The remainder of the pa-
per reviews how the economics literature models 
invasive species problems and the insights and 
policy conclusions that are obtained. 
The Economics of Invasive Species Control 
 
In the simplest intertemporal models of invasive 
species control, the state of the invasion, or its 
capital stock, is defined by its size. This may be 
the population or biomass of the invasive species, 
or it may be the area contained within the frontal 
boundary of the invasion, depending on the con-
text of the problem. The growth and spread of the 
invasive species is governed by a biologically 
determined transition equation. Control involves 
reducing the size of the invasion by chemical, 
biological, mechanical, manual, or other means. It 
is useful to think about the economics of control 
in two stages. First, for each possible reduction in 
the size of the invasion, a vector of inputs is se-
lected to achieve the desired level of control in 
the least-cost manner, given input prices.
3 This 
                                                                                    
3 Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) provide a useful discussion of 
econometric considerations in the estimation of production-based models 
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may or may not involve integrated management. 
The resulting control cost function depends on 
both the amount controlled (the reduction in the 
size of the invasion) and on the size of the inva-
sion being controlled.
4 Given the control cost 
function, the manager chooses control at each 
point in time to minimize expected discounted 
control costs and invasion damages over time, 
subject to the biological transition function for the 
invasion. The resulting dynamic optimization 
problem can be analyzed using dynamic pro-
gramming or optimal control.
5 A key point that 
emerges from such models is that the value of an 
additional unit of control is not simply the addi-
tional damages avoided today, but the discounted 
future sum of damages avoided, compounded by 
the growth in the invasion that would result from 
the unit of invasive species being controlled. 
  A precursor to the recent literature on the eco-
nomics of invasive species is Jaquette’s (1972) 
analysis of the existence of an optimal policy and 
the monotonicity of the optimal state transition in 
a finite-horizon, discrete-time biological popula-
tion control model. Regev, Gutierrez, and Feder 
(1976) point out that a number of factors lead 
individual pest control decisions to diverge from 
the social optimum. These include interseasonal 
dynamics, biological relationships with other pests 
and predators, pest resistance, environmental and 
health effects of pesticides, and neighborhood 
externalities. They derive the first-order necessary 
conditions for an interior optimal solution and 
compare the resulting steady states to the private 
(myopic) optima. They apply their model to al-
falfa weevil control and calculate a steady state 
                                                                                    
4 For example, historical attempts to eradicate invasive species indi-
cate that it may cost as much to remove the last 1 to 10 percent of an 
invasion as it does to control the initial 90 to 99 percent (Myers, Savoie, 
and van Randen 1998). 
5 In these models one complication arises from the fact that standard 
sufficiency conditions are typically not satisfied. To see why, consider 
the simplest possible case where the control cost and damage functions 
are both convex. Then the shadow price on the invasive species stock 
is negative, reflecting the fact that it imposes a cost. For this case, the 
standard Mangasarian (1966) sufficiency condition for optimal control 
requires the growth function to be convex. However, since all biologi-
cal invasions are bounded at some point, their growth function must be 
concave over some interval. In fact, following standard convention 
from the literature on renewable resources, it is common to assume that 
the growth function is globally concave. The literature typically de-
rives first-order necessary conditions for an interior solution and ana-
lyzes the economic implications under the explicit or implicit assump-
tion that the solution is optimal [e.g., Regev, Gutierrez, and Feder 
(1976), Zivin, Hueth, and Zilberman (2000), and Eiswerth and Johnson 
(2002)]. 
shadow cost of 2.3 cents per 1,000 emergent adults 
per acre. Shoemaker (1981) reviews early appli-
cations of dynamic programming to the problem 
of pest management, but these tend to focus on 
issues such as pesticide resistance and intrasea-
sonal management. 
  Olson and Roy (2003) use a dynamic program-
ming approach to characterize the optimal control 
of a biological invasion when both the biological 
growth function and the control cost function are 
allowed to exhibit non-convexities. They show 
that if the marginal costs of control are more sen-
sitive to changes in the invasion size than to 
changes in control, the optimal policy may in-
volve periodic control. In addition, they charac-
terize conditions under which eradication, main-
tenance control, and no control are economically 
efficient. 
  Wilman (1996) and Knowler and Barbier (2000) 
examine models with an invasive predator whose 
prey is harvested for its economic value. Eiswerth 
and Johnson (2002) develop an optimal control 
model of invasive species management where 
growth in the invasive species follows a logistic 
growth function. They derive the first-order 
necessary conditions and study comparative stat-
ics of the resulting steady state with respect to 
parameters of the model. They provide a numeri-
cal illustration of their results based on invasive 
weeds on rangeland in the western United States. 
Barbier and Shogren (2004) examine an endoge-
nous growth model in which the stock of invasive 
species is a function of the aggregate stock of 
capital in the economy. Invasive species are 
analogous to a pollution externality induced by 
the capital stock. They analyze the effect of this 
“biological pollution” on the balanced growth 
path when invasives affect only production and 
when invasives affect both production and wel-
fare. A key assumption is that the stock of inva-
sives is completely determined by the aggregate 
capital stock. It is difficult to see how this rela-
tionship might exist even as an approximation to 
any practical situation. 
  Environmental disturbances such as weather 
events can either accelerate or slow the spread of 
invasive species. A 1938 hurricane blew the gypsy 
moth across a barrier zone that had been estab-
lished along the Hudson River to slow its spread 
(Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
1985). Hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 contributed 182   April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
to the spread of citrus canker in Florida and 
forced the USDA to abandon an eradication pro-
gram begun in 1996 (Florida Department of Agri-
culture and Consumer Services 2006). There is 
debate about the extent to which climatic condi-
tions assisted the eradication of screwworm in the 
United States (Readshaw 1986, Krafsur et al. 
1986). Variations in climate also have an impor-
tant influence over the growth of invasive species 
populations. The successful eradication of nutria 
from the United Kingdom was aided by an above 
average number of harsh winters that slowed re-
production and increased juvenile mortality 
(Gosling and Baker 1989). Olson and Roy (2002) 
examine the economics of controlling a biological 
invasion whose natural growth and spread is non-
convex and subject to environmental distur-
bances. They characterize conditions under which 
it is optimal to eradicate the invasive species and 
conditions under which eradication is not optimal. 
The disturbance that produces the slowest expan-
sion in the invasion plays a critical role. Eiswerth 
and van Kooten (2002) examine a model of an 
invasive species infestation that has four possible 
states: minimal, moderate, high, and very high. 
They use an expert judgment questionnaire to 
develop fuzzy membership functions for each of 
the states and to construct a state transition prob-
ability matrix. Using stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming, they analyze the control of yellow 
starthistle in California and compare the effi-
ciency of five different management regimes. The 
policy choice varies depending on productivity 
and discount parameters, with expected net re-
turns ranging from $292 to $2,411 per acre. 
  Invasive species problems are often character-
ized by important spatial considerations. Brown, 
Lynch, and Zilberman (2002) examine a static 
model of the spatial control of an invasive species 
emanating from a source. Control involves vari-
able crop inputs, a barrier zone to reduce trans-
mission, and source control. The model is applied 
to analyze the control of Pierce’s disease and its 
transmission by sharpshooter leafhoppers in Cali-
fornia wine grapes. They find the optimal barrier 
width and grower profit to be sensitive to barrier 
effectiveness with profit per acre ranging from 
$3,054 to $5,201 as barrier effectiveness increases 
from 0 to 1. 
  Another important spatial issue is the possibil-
ity that reduced competition will encourage in-
ward migration of the invasive species from areas 
bordering the control zone. Huffaker, Bhat, and 
Lenhart (1992) develop a continuous time dy-
namic model of a nuisance species that occupies 
two adjacent parcels of land. Control on one par-
cel decreases population pressure relative to the 
environmental carrying capacity. This can in-
crease dispersal from the adjacent parcel. The 
authors derive the first-order necessary conditions 
and characterize the singular solution under spe-
cific functional forms. Sensitivity analysis with 
respect to parameters is done using numerical 
simulation. For the values examined, increases in 
the dispersal rate result in less control and a 
greater population in both areas. 
  Barrier zones have been used to slow or pre-
vent the spatial spread of several insect species 
including the gypsy moth, screwworm, boll wee-
vil, and Africanized honey bee. Sharov (2004) 
develops economic models of a barrier zone de-
signed to slow the spatial spread of an invasive 
species. Sharov first considers uniform spread on 
an infinite habitat strip, where damages are pro-
portional to the area invaded, or D×v×t, where D 
is marginal damage, v is the rate of spread, and t 
is time. A barrier that reduces the rate of spread 
by an amount ∆v lowers damages by δD∆v, 
where δ is the discount rate. Hence, the optimal 
policy equates the marginal cost of slowing the 
spread to its marginal value, δD. Sharov also dis-
cusses how barrier zones can be modeled when 
spread occurs in a limited area. It is possible for 
multiple local optima to exist, and numerical 
methods may be required to determine the global 
optimum. The management of gypsy moth spread 
in North America is used to illustrate how the 
methods can be applied in practical situations [see 
also Sharov and Leibhold (1998) and Sharov, 
Leibhold, and Roberts (1998)]. 
  For some species, management depends on life 
history traits of the species. Buhle, Margolis, and 
Ruesink (2005) analyze cost-effective control in 
two- or three-stage matrix population models. 
Using population elasticity analysis, they consider 
the combination of life-stage interventions that 
minimize the total cost of halting the population 
growth of an established invasive species. 
  Adaptation by species can be viewed as result-
ing from optimal responses to environmental 
conditions over time. Guitterez and Regev (2005) 
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analogy between economic and ecological opti-
mization and its implications for invasive species. 
In Guitterez and Regev (2005), species choose 
biological consumption to maximize adaptability 
of individuals over an infinite time horizon while 
still preserving the resource base. They discuss 
the implications of their model for the cowpea 
and cabbage aphids and the cotton boll weevil. 
Finnoff and Tschirhart (2005) focus on plant spe-
cies and assume that each plant maximizes net 
energy intake per unit of time. The ecosystem 
reaches a steady state when the available space is 
filled, each plant maximizes its net energy, and 
net energies are zero. Simulations illustrate how 
the model can be used to make simple predictions 
about species composition and vulnerability to 
invasion under different management regimes. 
  In recent years, biological control has received 
increased attention as a policy instrument for in-
vasive species management. McConnachie et al. 
(2003, Table 1) review 10 benefit-cost studies of 
successful biological control programs, including 
four insect pests, four terrestrial weeds, and two 
aquatic weeds. For terrestrials, the benefit-cost 
ratios range from 1.9:1 to 24:1. Van Wilgen et al. 
(2004) estimate the costs and benefits of biocon-
trol of six invasive weed species in South Africa, 
where biocontrol has been practiced since 1910. 
They estimate benefit-cost ratios ranging from 8:1 
for red sesbania to 709:1 for jointed cactus. The 
estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the 
rate of spread with a 3 percent decrease in bene-
fits for each one percent decrease in the rate of 
spread. Biological control programs are not with-
out risks, however. Control species may become 
invasive themselves and adversely impact non-
target species. For example, feral cats introduced 
on many islands to control rats have proved so 
damaging to island ecology that they are now 
subject to eradication programs (Nogales et al. 
2004). The cane toad (Bufo marinus) is another 
example of biological control gone awry. Intro-
duced in Australia in 1935 as a biological control 
for scarab beetles, pests of sugar cane, they failed 
as a control and have subsequently become a sig-
nificant ecological pest (McLeod 2004). 
The Economics of Invasive Species Prevention 
Prevention is the second primary policy instru-
ment that can be used to mitigate the damages 
caused by invasive species. While the goal of 
control is to reduce or eliminate the damages 
caused by invasive species, the goal of prevention 
is to avoid damages and/or control costs. The two 
policies are necessarily interdependent. The opti-
mal strategy for prevention necessarily depends 
on the social costs of an invasion, should it occur. 
Likewise, the optimal strategy for control must 
account for the possibility that an invasion may 
recur. Olson and Roy (2005) examine a static 
model of the trade-off between prevention and 
control under uncertainty. An established inva-
sion is managed through control. Invasive species 
introductions are a random variable, but can be 
reduced through prevention. The objective is to 
minimize the expected costs of prevention, con-
trol, and damages. All costs and damages are 
convex. The optimal control is increasing in the 
invasion size. If marginal control costs are more 
sensitive to changes in control than to changes in 
the invasion size, then both optimal prevention 
and the optimal post-control invasion size in-
crease with the initial invasion size. If marginal 
control costs are more sensitive to changes in the 
invasion size, then both optimal prevention and 
the optimal post-control invasion size decrease 
with the initial invasion size. Both optimal control 
and optimal prevention are increasing in the inva-
sion growth rate. The results also show how 
prevention and control vary with a shift in the 
distribution of invasive species introductions that 
satisfies monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) domi-
nance. When absolute aversion to risk decreases 
in the introduction size, prevention increases as 
the distribution shifts upward, while control in-
creases if the elasticity of marginal damage is 
decreasing in the introduction size. In somewhat 
related work, Leung et al. (2005) use a stylized 
model with specific functional forms to analyze 
the effect of parameter changes on prevention and 
control. 
  Sumner (2003) and Sumner, Bervijillo, and 
Jarvis (2005) point out that invasive species poli-
cies such as border control and eradication pro-
grams have attributes of public goods for affected 
consumers and producers, in that they are often 
non-rival and non-excludable. Sumner (2003) 
suggests that funding invasive species programs 
through commodity levies has an advantage over 
the use of general tax revenue in that levies trans-
fer much of the cost of invasive species policy to 
the beneficiaries. 184   April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
  Horan et al. (2002) examine a model of inva-
sive species prevention. In their model there are n 
independent potential invasion pathways. Inva-
sion is treated as a Bernoulli event: an invasion 
either occurs or it does not. The optimal policy 
for each pathway balances the marginal cost of 
prevention against the expected marginal dam-
ages prevented, where damages are prevented 
only if an invasion does not occur through an-
other pathway. They examine different decision 
models, including expected utility and a model of 
decision making under ignorance. 
  In reality, private agents act to reduce private 
damages caused by invasive species, and if gov-
ernment agencies fail to recognize this there may 
be a misallocation of resources. In a set of papers 
with a common theme, Finnoff and Shogren 
(2004) and Finnoff et al. (2005a, 2005b) examine 
how interactions between public managers, my-
opic private agents, risk aversion, and the per-
ceived state of an invasion affect the allocation of 
resources for prevention and control and find that 
the results are sensitive to initial conditions. 
  Heikkila and Peltola (2004) examine the cost of 
maintaining the Finnish protected zone for the 
Colorado potato beetle using measures to prevent 
an invasion and control to eradicate invasions that 
occur. They estimate deterministic prevention costs 
of i350,000 and eradication costs of i946,931. 
  Intentional introductions of non-native species 
raise a distinct set of economic and policy issues. 
Such introductions will occur only if some agent 
expects a benefit from the species. The potential 
for limited liability exists if the releasing agent is 
not fully responsible for negative consequences 
that may arise if the species turns out to be inva-
sive. This creates incentive problems for the de-
sign of effective policy. Thomas and Randall 
(2000) examine this problem in a principal-agent 
setting. In their model, the release of a non-in-
digenous species generates a private benefit X for 
the agent and possibly a large (yet reversible) 
social loss S where S > X and the probability of S, 
P(S) = θ. Success in revoking the negative conse-
quences of a release is random with probability r. 
Maintaining the option to revoke S and the act of 
revoking S involve expenditures of c(r, θ). When 
the incentives of society and individuals align the 
solution is a value of r, or equivalently, c(r,θ), 
that balances the marginal cost of revoking S 
against the expected social loss of the introduc-
tion. In reality, releasing agents do not bear all of 
the social costs of invasive species, even when 
releases are intentional. Thomas and Randall 
(2000) suppose that the agent selects the level of 
revocability, but faces limited ex post liability in 
the event a large social loss occurs. They then 
consider the decision problem of the agent if the 
principal requires an assurance bond to cover 
potential losses, should they occur. In this case 
the agent chooses r to equate the marginal cost of 
revocability to the minimum of the expected so-
cial loss and the private loss if the bond is for-
feited. Shogren, Herriges, and Govindasamy 
(1993) discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of assurance bonds as a means of reducing envi-
ronmental externalities. They draw on previous 
work on labor economics that examines the limits 
of bonds as a mechanism to prevent worker 
shirking and they identify three difficulties asso-
ciated with environmental bonds. These are (i) 
regulator moral hazard where the principal may 
impose liability without cause, (ii) liquidity con-
straints that prevent the agent from posting the 
required bond, and (iii) legal restrictions on con-
tracts that provide avenues for an agent to chal-
lenge the loss of a bond. All three of these are 
likely to be issues for using bonds as a mecha-
nism to reduce invasive species introductions. 
The Economics of International Trade and 
Invasive Species 
Many invasive species introductions occur as a 
result of trade. Not surprisingly, public policy 
aimed at reducing the potential risk and scale of 
biological invasion has targeted regulation of 
international trade as one of the primary means of 
preventing domestic control costs as well as the 
ecological and economic damages that arise when 
alien species establish and expand over time. In-
ternational trade agreements recognize that it is 
important for individual countries to “have the 
right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health” [Article 2, World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement)]. The main objective of non-tariff or 
technical barriers to trade is to correct external-
ities or market inefficiencies caused by invasive Olson  The Economics of Terrestrial Invasive Species: A Review of the Literature   185 
 
 
species in the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of goods. 
  Roberts, Josling, and Orden (1999) and Roberts 
(1999) propose that technical trade barriers be 
classified by policy instrument, scope, and regu-
latory goal. They use the proposed classification 
scheme to analyze the results of a 1996 USDA 
survey of over 300 foreign technical barriers to 
U.S. agricultural exports. Roberts, Josling, and 
Orden (1999) also examine partial equilibrium 
models that can be used to study the effects of 
technical trade barriers. Beghin and Bureau (2001) 
survey methods to quantify the impact of SPS and 
other non-tariff trade barriers on market equilib-
rium, trade flows, economic efficiency, and wel-
fare. They review the price wedge method, inven-
tory, survey, and gravity based approaches, risk 
assessment based cost-benefit analysis, microeco-
nomic based approaches, and multi-market models. 
Studies that utilize the methods are surveyed and 
the practical validity of each method is discussed. 
Smith (2003) provides a useful summary of the 
SPS compliance requirements of the WTO Agree-
ment and examines their role in a number of 
prominent disputes, including the Australian ban 
on Canadian salmon, the Japanese ban on U.S. 
apples, foot-and-mouth disease, and exotic New-
castle disease. Mumford (2002) provides a gen-
eral overview of the economic issues related to 
quarantine policy and trade. He discusses the 
relation between increased trade and quarantine 
threats, the impacts of quarantine on trade, inter-
national agreements related to quarantine, and cri-
teria to evaluate quarantine policy, including the 
appropriate level of protection, effectiveness (in a 
technical sense), economic efficiency, distribu-
tional concerns, and cost recovery. Lynch (2002) 
develops a model of import bans and subsidies 
for control in the exporting country and applies it 
to the Mexican fruit fly problem and trade be-
tween the United States, Mexico, and Central 
America. She points out that, by reducing demand 
and hence prices, SPS regulations can lead to less 
pest control by foreign producers. This can in-
crease the risk of pest infestation through other 
pathways not affected by SPS regulations. Cos-
tello and McAusland (2003) examine the link be-
tween trade, protectionism, and invasive species 
damage. They examine circumstances under which 
more protection reduces invasive species damage. 
They also make the important point that changes 
in trade restrictions alter the mix of domestic 
outputs. If freer trade leads to a shift away from 
outputs susceptible to pest damage, and if this 
shift is large enough to offset the increase in 
invasions that accompany greater trade volumes, 
then freer trade can lower invasive species dam-
ages, contrary to intuition. 
  McAusland and Costello (2004) consider a 
static model of the use of tariffs and inspections 
to reduce trade-induced invasive species dam-
ages. When inspections are costly, the optimal 
policy has the following characteristics: the opti-
mal inspection intensity never detects all incom-
ing pests (it is assumed that the marginal produc-
tivity of inspections declines to zero as the detec-
tion rate approaches one), and the optimal tariff 
recovers the cost of inspection plus the damage 
expected from invasive species imported on 
goods that are not rejected by the imperfect in-
spections. Because the inspection costs are recov-
ered by the tariff, inspections are optimally cho-
sen to minimize the cost of consumer goods. In-
spection intensity increases with the damage pa-
rameter, and increases and then decreases with 
the invasion rate; for high invasion rates it is not 
worth spending money to confirm that goods are 
contaminated. The optimal tariff increases with 
the damage parameter and the invasion rate 
unless better inspections lead to a decline in ex-
pected damage that more than offsets the in-
creased inspection cost. McAusland and Costello 
(2004) also examine two variations of the model. 
The first allows exporting firms to treat exports to 
reduce the invasion rate, while the second consid-
ers a two-period model. For the latter, it turns out 
that the optimal dynamic inspection level is at 
least as high as the static level, while the optimal 
dynamic tariff can be more or less than the opti-
mal static tariff. 
  Political economy considerations and interest 
group lobbying have played an important role in 
trade policy toward goods impacted by invasive 
species. Romano and Orden (1997) discuss the 
political economy of U.S. import restrictions on 
nursery stock and ornamental plants. Roberts and 
Krissoff (2004) examine the use of SPS trade bar-
riers in international horticultural markets, the 
extent to which countries have harmonized their 
standards under the WTO agreement, and the 
status of 33 complaints related to SPS restrictions 
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Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer (2005) incorporate 
an invasive species externality into the Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) political economy model of 
trade. They show that the equilibrium tariff with 
an externality is simply the optimal tariff (mar-
ginal damages) plus the equilibrium tariff found 
by Grossman and Helpman for the case where 
there is no externality. The result simply restates 
the Grossman-Helpman result in a way that ac-
counts for marginal damages; however, it does 
point out the potential difficulty in distinguishing 
disguised interest group protectionism from le-
gitimate SPS trade measures. 
  Balancing protection from invasive species 
against the costs of regulation to consumers and 
producers poses significant challenges to regula-
tors, particularly because decisions need to be 
made in an environment where there is uncer-
tainty about the consequences of different policy 
alternatives. A sound empirical approach is needed. 
Sumner and Lee (1997) illustrate how the effects 
of SPS rules on export supply and import demand 
functions might be incorporated into empirical 
trade models. Glauber and Narrod (2001, 2003) 
provide a critical examination of the quarantine 
program designed to prevent the spread of karnal 
bunt. In the first paper they argue that a failure to 
adequately integrate risk assessment with eco-
nomic analysis led to suboptimal regulations that 
cost producers, consumers, and taxpayers more 
than $350 million per year, when losses due to 
restrictions on seed development are included. 
James and Anderson (1998) conduct a partial 
equilibrium analysis of Australian quarantine pol-
icy to protect domestic banana production from 
pests and diseases. They consider both a fixed and 
ad valorem marketing margin, and for the latter 
they consider three different supply elasticities. In 
all four scenarios the gains in consumer surplus 
outweigh the costs to producers if the import ban 
is lifted, even though in two of the scenarios 
domestic production is not competitive under free 
trade and would be eliminated. Likewise, Orden, 
Narrod and Glauber (2000) report results by 
Orden and Romano (1996) that suggest that the 
U.S. trade ban on Haas avocados from Mexico 
imposed a net welfare loss on the United States, 
even in the worst-case scenario where lifting the 
trade ban would be certain to result in a pest 
infestation. In contrast, Hoddle, Jetter, and Morse 
(2003) estimate a welfare loss of $4.6–7.6 million 
if an avocado pest establishes in California and 
raises industry costs by 3.6 percent. The regula-
tory process surrounding the Haas avocado case 
is described in detail in Roberts and Orden (1997). 
(Recently, U.S. trade policy toward Haas avoca-
dos has loosened, although some restrictions re-
main.) Calvin and Krissoff (1998) investigate the 
effects of the Japanese tariff and phytosanitary 
standards for Fuji apples on imports from the 
United States. Using a tariff-rate equivalent of the 
import ban, they estimate that an average yield 
loss of 30 percent or more would be required to 
eliminate the welfare gains from free trade. In 
2002 the United States requested that the WTO 
review Japan’s phytosanitary protocol, and in 
2005 Japan issued a new protocol that eliminated 
standards designed to prevent fire blight, but 
maintained standards to prevent codling moth. 
Using the same methodology as their earlier pa-
per, Calvin and Krissoff (2005) measure the cost 
of the fire blight protocol and the expected vol-
ume and value of imports that would have oc-
curred under the new protocol during the period 
1998–2004. They estimate a change in the value 
of Fuji apple imports ranging from $8.9 million to 
$228 million, depending on the year. This points 
out that there may be substantial variation in mar-
ket conditions over time and that a single year 
may not provide an accurate representation of the 
true economic impact of changes in phytosanitary 
standards. 
  Acquaye et al. (2005) focus on the conse-
quences for producers and consumers of policies 
to reduce invasive species damages in the face of 
preexisting agricultural polices for commodities. 
They point out that the effects of invasive species 
policy on supply are similar to the effects of an 
improvement in production technology. A case 
study of the economic consequences of citrus 
canker illustrates that it is important to recognize 
existing agricultural policies when calculating the 
costs of invasive species. In their example, the 
costs of citrus canker are overestimated by $10 
million annually, or by 7 percent, if the effects of 
existing tariffs and subsidies for frozen concen-
trated orange juice are ignored. 
Economic Models of Invasive Plants 
Wu (2001) develops a dynamic model of weed 
control with the weed seed bank as the state vari-Olson  The Economics of Terrestrial Invasive Species: A Review of the Literature   187 
 
 
able. The manager’s problem is to choose herbi-
cide applications in each period to maximize the 
discounted sum of net benefits over time. Wu 
analyzes the first-order necessary conditions and 
imposes functional forms that allow a closed-
form solution for optimal weed and seed densities 
and herbicide applications. A numerical example 
based on weed control in Iowa corn production is 
provided. Odom et al. (2003) develop a discrete-
choice, dynamic programming model of Scotch 
broom control in Australia. Economic benefits 
depend on weed density. In their model, both the 
weed seed bank and weed density are included as 
state variables. Five control instruments are avail-
able, with feasible values of 0 or 1 (each control 
instrument is either used or not). They are as fol-
lows: exclude tourists, remove weeds manually, 
apply herbicides, control wild pigs, and biological 
control. The dynamic programming problem is 
solved numerically to obtain the optimal mix of 
control policies as a function of weed and seed 
density. At very low weed and seed densities, the 
optimal policy is to do nothing, but over a broad 
range of higher densities the optimal policy in-
volves a mix of manual removal, herbicides, and 
biological control. Jetter et al. (2003) analyze the 
expected benefits and costs of a statewide bio-
logical control program to manage the rangeland 
weed, yellow starthistle, in California. They cal-
culate a break-even probability of success that 
determines when the expected benefits of a con-
trol program exceed the costs. The probability 
depends on assumptions about the benefits from 
rangeland restoration. As benefits increase from 
$1 per acre for both infested and susceptible lands 
to $50 per acre for susceptible land, the break-
even probability declines from 21 percent to 0.6 
percent. Rangeland restoration costs under a suc-
cessful biological control program are estimated 
to be 25 percent less than under a chemical con-
trol program. 
  Eiswerth et al. (2005) use input-output analysis 
to estimate the effect of nonindigenous invasive 
weeds on the economy of Nevada. The rate at 
which invasive weeds reduce wildlife recreation 
expenditures is taken from Leitch, Leistritz, and 
Bangsund (1996). For a range of parameter val-
ues they estimate a total impact on Nevada of 
–$5.9 million to –$22.3 million per year. Higgins 
et al. (1997) conduct a dynamic simulation of an 
ecological-economic model of alien plant control 
in a mountain fynbos ecosystem in South Africa. 
Under the simulation the cost of a proactive 
clearing policy ranges from 0.6 to 4.76 percent of 
the economic value of ecosystem services, but 
increases the value of these services between 138 
and 149 percent, depending on the assumptions of 
the model. 
  DiTomaso (2000) identifies a number of nox-
ious weeds that have significant impacts on range-
lands and reviews some of the literature on the 
economic and ecological costs of these weeds. He 
then discusses options for noxious weed manage-
ment including prevention, eradication, and con-
trol. Options for control include mechanical, cul-
tural, biological, chemical, and integrated man-
agement. 
  Knowler and Barbier (2005) develop a model 
of a commercial nursery industry that imports 
ornamental plants that pose a risk of becoming 
invasive. In the private market equilibrium, nurs-
eries do not internalize the social costs of poten-
tial invasions, and the industry expands until the 
last nursery to enter the industry earns zero profit. 
Potential invasions are modeled using a hazard 
function that defines the probability that an inva-
sion occurs at t, given that it has not occurred 
prior to t. The social optimum balances industry 
profit against the expected social cost of manag-
ing a potential invasion. Consequently, the in-
dustry size is smaller in the social optimum than 
the private market equilibrium. In principle, a 
Pigouvian tax can be used to implement the social 
optimum. An illustration of the model based on 
saltcedar is developed. The numerical results vary 
significantly depending on assumptions about the 
dependence of the hazard function on the number 
of firms in the industry. 
Economic Models of Invasive Animals 
In the United States invasive wildlife species 
cause damage in every state and all U.S. territo-
ries. Bergman, Chandler, and Locklear (2002) 
summarize, by species, the geographic locations 
that requested assistance from USDA=s Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service Wildlife Ser-
vices Program in order to alleviate damage 
caused by vertebrate wildlife species from 1990 
to 1997. More than 45 vertebrate invasive species 
were verified as a cause of economic damage. 188   April 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
  Many wildlife populations cause damage to 
agricultural or environmental systems but are also 
valued for commercial or recreational reasons or 
for their contribution to biological diversity. Ex-
amples include fur-bearing animals, deer, and 
feral pigs. Whether a species is a pest or a re-
source may depend on social, economic, regula-
tory, and environmental circumstances. Zivin, 
Hueth, and Zilberman (2000) examine a bioeco-
nomic model of a species that causes pest damage 
but has value to hunters. The landowner can con-
trol the species through trapping or the sale of 
hunting rights. They characterize first-order nec-
essary conditions that maximize intertemporal 
welfare for three possible steady state outcomes: 
trapping and hunting, trapping only, and hunting 
only. In the first two cases the shadow value of 
the species is negative, while in the third case the 
shadow value of the resource may be positive to 
reflect the fact that the marginal value to hunters 
may exceed marginal pest damages. The model is 
illustrated with a case study of feral pigs in 
California rangeland. Skonhoft and Olaussen 
(2005) consider a spatial version of this problem, 
where there is migration between two locations 
that are managed separately using only harvest 
from hunting. The objective is to maximize static, 
steady state welfare, rather than the true dynamic 
optimum. The static, steady state welfare maxi-
mum is achieved by equating the value of mar-
ginal growth in each location to marginal pest 
damage. 
  Rats are commonly believed to be the world<s 
most widespread invasive mammal, with the 
greatest economic impact. They have had enor-
mous ecological impact on islands and are re-
sponsible for more island extinctions of birds, 
snakes, and lizards than any other predators 
(Matthews 2004). They cause enormous damage 
to agriculture. Singleton (2003) estimates that 
rodents in Asia cause losses to rice production of 
5–10 percent per annum, enough food to feed 180 
million people annually, while Pimentel et al. 
(2000) value the economic damage caused by rats 
in the United States at $19 billion per year. Sten-
seth et al. (2003) discuss how bioeconomic mod-
eling might be used to improve rodent manage-
ment, and they provide useful background infor-
mation for five different pest rodents. Skonhoft et 
al. (forthcoming) investigate the economics of 
control of the multimammate rat, an African pest 
rodent that causes significant damage to maize 
production. The ecological model is a density-de-
pendent matrix population model that incorpo-
rates the effect of stochastic rainfall on rat popu-
lation growth. The economic model is based on 
village-level data from Tanzania. Rats are con-
trolled by poison, and social costs are measured 
by the discounted sum of control and damage 
costs. The model is too complex for analytical 
solutions so policy options are evaluated numeri-
cally using the median social cost. The results 
suggest that the most cost-effective policy is to 
control 3–4 months every year, particularly at the 
end of the dry season/beginning of the rainy sea-
son. The current practice of applying poison 
when heavy rodent damage is observed appears to 
be associated with a substantial reduction in the 
welfare of maize-producing farmers. 
Economic Models of Plant and Animal Disease 
Animal and plant diseases represent microbial 
forms of invasive species. Horan and Wolf (2005) 
develop a two-state, linear control model of man-
agement of an infectious wildlife disease. The 
two state variables are the wildlife biomass and 
the fraction of the population infected. The two 
controls are harvesting and feeding. Harvests 
cannot differentiate between infected and healthy 
animals and affect only the dynamics of wildlife 
biomass, while feeding influences both wildlife 
growth, through nutrition, and disease transmis-
sion, by reducing disease-related mortality and 
because wildlife congregate around feeding sta-
tions. Harvested wildlife has economic value, 
while infected animals impose damages through 
their potential to transmit the disease to livestock 
or other commercially valuable species. Horan 
and Wolf (2005) characterize the double singular 
solution and solve a numerical example to illus-
trate the control of bovine tuberculosis in Michi-
gan deer populations. They find that because har-
vested deer are valuable, eradication of the dis-
ease is not likely to be economically efficient 
unless the state of Michigan faces fixed costs 
associated with livestock testing or trade restric-
tions. Horan et al. (2005) discuss how the analy-
sis can be extended to capture spatial interactions 
between wildlife populations and disease trans-
mission. Olson  The Economics of Terrestrial Invasive Species: A Review of the Literature   189 
 
 
  One animal disease that has received signifi-
cant attention is foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). 
Paarlberg and Lee (1998) develop a framework to 
determine the optimal tariff on imports that carry 
a risk of disease, such as livestock imports and 
FMD. From the perspective of the importing 
country, the optimal tariff should account for the 
risk of importing FMD and the resulting loss in 
domestic output. A numerical, partial equilibrium 
model of U.S. beef imports is used to compare 
tariffs with and without FMD risk. The findings 
are sensitive to assumptions about risk and output 
loss. Thompson et al. (2002) estimate the eco-
nomic impact of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the 
United Kingdom in which 4 million animals were 
slaughtered under disease control measures. They 
calculate a total cost of ,3.1 billion. Because 
farmers were compensated for slaughtered ani-
mals, these costs were largely borne by the pub-
lic, and the cost to agricultural producers was 
estimated to be ,355 million. Ekboir (1999) and 
Ekboir, Jarvis, and Bervejillo (2003) simulate the 
effects of a potential FMD outbreak in California 
under different scenarios about disease transmis-
sion and policy response. They estimate total 
costs ranging from $6.8 to $13.5 billion, includ-
ing direct costs of sacrificing animals, cleaning, 
and disinfecting, plus indirect costs of disruptions 
to trade. This estimate does not consider potential 
effects on tourism and wildlife, meat processors, 
and distributors, or environmental consequences 
from disposing of diseased animals. Paarlberg, 
Lee, and Seitzinger (2002) estimate that an FMD 
outbreak in the United States would result in a 
reduction in farm revenue of $14 billion. Paarl-
berg, Lee, and Seitzinger (2003) suggest that the 
welfare effects for producers and consumers 
should be decomposed. Slaughter and quarantine 
measures will be imposed only on some produc-
ers, and the remaining producers will respond to 
changes in market prices. In addition, some con-
sumers will reduce or stop consuming beef while 
others will not, with correspondingly different 
welfare effects. Paarlberg, Lee and Seitzinger 
(2005) survey these articles and others that ex-
amine the economic impacts of livestock disease. 
Another recent review of this literature is pro-
vided by Pritchett, Thilmany, and Johnson (2005). 
They classify models based on the level of the 
analysis: consumer, producer, meat processors, 
input suppliers, supporting activities, and market-
ing channels, and studies of regional, national, 
and international scope. 
  Plant diseases such as soybean rust, citrus can-
ker, and karnal bunt pose potentially serious 
threats to U.S. agricultural production. Citrus 
canker has been detected in Florida on three oc-
casions. Twice it has been declared eradicated—
in 1933 following detection in 1910—and in 
1994 following detection in 1986. It was detected 
again near Miami in 1995, and a third eradication 
campaign was begun (Florida Department of Ag-
riculture and Consumer Services 2006). Zansler, 
Spreen, and Muraro (2005) estimate the dis-
counted sum of net benefits of Florida<s citrus 
canker eradication program from 1996 onward at 
$2.26 billion, under the assumption that no rein-
festation occurs. Unfortunately, the USDA now 
believes that eradication is no longer feasible due 
to potential spread of the disease by hurricanes in 
2004 and 2005, and a new citrus canker manage-
ment plan is being formulated (Conner 2006). 
Jetter, Civerolo, and Sumner (2003) analyze the 
economic effects of a potential citrus canker inva-
sion in California. They consider welfare effects 
under different policy scenarios involving urban 
and/or commercial eradication programs with or 
without compensation, as well as potential trade 
embargo considerations. 
Conclusion 
The literature on the economics of invasive spe-
cies management has developed rapidly in recent 
years, but there is much room for further work. 
Uncertainty, spatial modeling, prevention, trade, 
and conflict between private and public incen-
tives are all areas where there is a need for more 
sophisticated analyses. There is also a significant 
need for the development of better data and tech-
niques to support more accurate empirical as-
sessments of invasive species damages and con-
trol costs. Work in these areas should help im-
prove invasive species policy and achieve a more 
effective use of resources. 
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